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Time for the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Advisory Committee to set its own agenda
Drug subsidy recommendations should be informed by active assessment of current 
evidence and emerging treatments
ecisions about which medicines should be subsi-
dised by the Australian Government on the Phar-
maceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) are based on
recommendations made by the Pharmaceutical Benefits
Advisory Committee (PBAC) — an independent statutory
body appointed by the government.1
The PBAC lists among its goals maximising the “value”
that Australia derives from its health expenditure and
“meet[ing] the health needs of the majority of the Austral-
ian community”.2 While the PBAC is generally thought to
have in place good processes for working towards these
goals, its decisions are increasingly contested by consumers,
governments, clinicians and the pharmaceutical industry.3
For example, concern has been expressed about the PBS’s
subsidisation of ranibizumab (Lucentis), a vascular endothe-
lial growth factor (VEGF) inhibitor used for the treatment of
wet age-related macular degeneration (AMD), when a far
cheaper and probably equally effective alternative — bevaci-
zumab (Avastin), a VEGF inhibitor listed for cancer but not
for AMD — was available.4 The listing of ranibizumab, it was
argued, was inconsistent with the goals of the PBAC and
PBS because it is about 40 times more expensive than
bevacizumab, and costs taxpayers over $200 million each
year (second only to atorvastatin and rosuvastatin).
A recent development has brought the issue to light
once again: Bayer Healthcare and Regeneron Pharmaceu-
ticals are, together, likely to seek PBS listing for yet another
VEGF inhibitor, aflibercept (VEGF Trap-Eye), recently
approved by the Therapeutic Goods Administration,5 to
treat wet AMD. Although aflibercept has not been shown
to have greater efficacy than ranibizumab, patients only
need an injection every 2 months, compared with monthly
for ranibizumab.6 But even if this did provide some benefit
to patients and reduced the cost of therapy, which it is only
likely to do by a small degree, it would still leave bevacizu-
mab unlisted, and taxpayers would still be paying signifi-
cantly more than they need to, overall, to cover the cost of
treatment for wet AMD.
One possible explanation for such a situation is that the
PBAC currently relies entirely upon interested parties
putting forward submissions for listing, rather than proac-
tively seeking submissions in the public interest. In practice,
this means that almost all submissions come from commer-
cial sponsors, and the agenda of the PBAC is largely
determined by the interests of the pharmaceutical industry.
This is potentially problematic, because commercial spon-
sors are unlikely to go to the trouble of listing medicines for
indications that are not commercially attractive.
In theory, there is nothing to stop professional societies
or consumer organisations from making their own sub-
missions to the PBAC in the public interest. However, non-
commercial organisations seldom have the resources and
expertise to conduct and synthesise the research into
clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and the broader
impacts of health technologies that is needed to make a
case for PBS listing.
But need this be the case? Some overseas agencies
charged with health technology appraisal (eg, in the
D
Wendy L Lipworth
MB BS, MSc, PhD,
Postdoctoral Fellow1
Ian Kerridge
 MPhil, FRACP, FRCPA,
Director2
Richard O Day
 MD, FRACP,
Director3
1 Australian Institute of
Health Innovation,
University of New South
Wales, Sydney, NSW.
2 Centre for Values, Ethics
and the Law in Medicine,
University of Sydney,
Sydney, NSW.
3 Clinical Pharmacology
and Toxicology, St Vincent's
Hospital, Sydney, NSW.
w.lipworth@
unsw.edu.au
doi: 10.5694/mja12.10152
Editorials
375MJA 196 (6) · 2 April 2012
United Kingdom7 and Canada8) place more emphasis on
setting their own priorities for health technology assess-
ment than does the PBAC. We suggest that it may be
possible to expand the role of the PBAC so that it has the
power to, first, identify emerging or established pharma-
ceutical agents that might require evaluation on the basis
of likely public interest (“horizon scanning”); second,
invite professional societies to prepare submissions in
these priority areas; and, third, provide the necessary
financial and scientific support to these organisations so
that they do not need to be burdened by prohibitive costs
or legal liability.
Orphan drug provisions, which allow the PBAC to waive
submission fees for medicines that have no sponsor or are
not commercially viable,9 go some way towards redressing
the imbalance between commercial and non-commercial
interests; but, even here, the onus is on professional and
consumer organisations to initiate and prepare submis-
sions.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that, in Australia, efforts
have been made to initiate horizon scanning for non-
pharmaceutical health technologies through the Australia
and New Zealand Horizon Scanning Network
(ANZHSN), which makes recommendations to the Medi-
cal Services Advisory Committee (MSAC).10 Horizon scan-
ning may:
• identify new technologies with major implications for
the health system;
• control the adoption and use of technologies; and,
• identify underused technologies, as might be the case
with the listing of bevacizumab for the treatment of
AMD.10
Expanding the role of the PBAC would not be easy. It
would probably require the establishment of a separate
government-funded body that would conduct horizon
scanning, make recommendations to the PBAC, seek sub-
missions from relevant professional organisations and pro-
vide these organisations with the financial and
administrative support that they would need to conduct or
commission the necessary health technology assessments.
A subcommittee of the PBAC, to whom the horizon-
scanning body could make its recommendations, would
probably also need to be formed.
And even if such a mechanism could be established,
questions would remain, such as: Who should set priorities
for seeking PBS listings? What criteria should be used for
prioritising potential listings (eg, novelty, financial impact,
clinical impact, disease burden)? What processes should
be used to identify areas of need (eg, specialty mapping,
forecasting, public ranking exercises)? And how can such
processes be inclusive and transparent?8,10 Such practical
difficulties are evident in the non-pharmaceutical medical
technology sector in Australia, where, despite the exist-
ence of a separate government-funded horizon-scanning
body, the impetus for the MSAC to conduct a health
technology assessment almost always stems from an
application by a commercial sponsor.10 But, unless steps
are taken in this direction regardless of such difficulties,
the PBAC will be unable to reach its full potential as an
agency committed to universal benefits and the systematic
application of evidence-based decision making.11
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